Borrowed Coats: The Forgotten Hosts Still Spending Your Domain's Reputation
Photo: Elmiocid69, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons
Ask a UK SME how many subdomains it owns and you'll usually get a confident, wrong answer. The real number lives in three places nobody keeps in sync: the DNS zone, the certificate transparency logs, and the admin consoles of about six SaaS platforms that each created a hostname on your behalf and then forgot to mention it.
Your apex domain can be spotless — DMARC at p=reject, SPF tight, DKIM rotated quarterly — and still be undermined by promo., news., go., portal., track. or info. pointing at a tenant that was cancelled two years ago.
How a subdomain becomes a liability
Three failure modes, in rough order of how often they bite.
The dangling CNAME. Someone points offers.yourdomain.co.uk at yourbrand.offerplatform.example. The campaign ends, the account is closed, the CNAME stays. Now anyone who can claim that hostname on the platform inherits a name that resolves under your domain. Whether they can also get a valid certificate depends on the platform — plenty still hand out certs for customer vanity domains without re-verifying ownership.
The abandoned host. Not dangling, just forgotten. An old landing page on a cheap host, running a CMS last patched in 2023. It doesn't spoof your domain; it is your domain, which makes it a perfect place to host a phishing kit. Filters that score on domain age and reputation will wave it straight through to a customer's inbox.
The borrowed sender. A subdomain with its own permissive SPF record and no DMARC policy of its own. Because DMARC falls back to the organisational domain, a p=none at the apex quietly neuters every subdomain beneath it — and sp= is the field most people have never set.
DMARC alignment doesn't mean what people think
Two things worth getting straight before you go hunting.
First, sp= (subdomain policy). If you publish v=DMARC1; p=reject; with no sp=, subdomains inherit p=reject. If you publish p=none, they inherit p=none — including the ones you've forgotten about. Publishing sp=reject explicitly while you're still at p=none on the apex is one of the cheapest wins available, and it forces you to find out which of your subdomains actually send mail.
Second, alignment. Relaxed alignment (adkim=r, aspf=r, the default) means mail.yourdomain.co.uk can align to yourdomain.co.uk. That's convenient — and it means a compromised subdomain's DKIM key is effectively a compromised key for the whole organisational domain. Strict alignment (adkim=s) narrows that, at the cost of breaking every third party sending from a subdomain of its own.
Run this and read it carefully:
dig +short TXT _dmarc.yourdomain.co.uk
dig +short TXT _dmarc.promo.yourdomain.co.uk
The second query returning nothing is normal and fine. The second query returning p=none when you didn't put it there is not.
Finding the hosts you've forgotten
Certificate transparency logs are the fastest inventory tool nobody uses. Every publicly trusted certificate issued for your domain gets logged, and those logs are queryable by anyone. Query your apex, get a list of subdomains, and prepare to be mildly alarmed.
Then do the boring reconciliation:
- Zone file. Export every A, AAAA and CNAME record. If your DNS is managed by an agency, ask for the export in writing.
- CT logs. Cross-reference. Anything in the logs but not in the zone is worth a look — it may be a wildcard certificate, or it may be history.
- SaaS consoles. Marketing automation, helpdesk, e-signature, event platforms, payment pages. Each one has a custom-domain screen, and each one has a list of what it's currently serving.
- The paperwork. The domain list from your last penetration test or cyber insurance questionnaire is often more current than the zone file.
The monthly routine
This doesn't need a tool. It needs twenty minutes and a calendar reminder.
For every hostname on your list:
dig +short CNAME promo.yourdomain.co.uk
dig +short A promo.yourdomain.co.uk
If the CNAME points at a third-party hostname, resolve that too. A CNAME whose target returns NXDOMAIN is a dangling record — fix or remove it the same day. A CNAME whose target resolves to a parking page or a generic 'this service is no longer available' screen is a takeover waiting to happen.
Then check the certificate. A hostname serving a certificate issued to someone else, or a certificate issued in the last fortnight that you didn't request, is a five-alarm event. The NCSC's guidance on domain hygiene is worth bookmarking here; the advice is dull and it works.
Finally, put the whole list under DNS change monitoring. Free and cheap services will email you when a record changes. That single control turns a silent takeover into a same-day notification.
When you find one live
If a host is serving content you didn't put there, treat it as a live incident, not a housekeeping task. Take the DNS record down first — that's the switch you actually control. Then revoke certificates, pull whatever logs the host will give you, and search your own mail logs for outbound messages referencing that hostname.
Then tell your users. A short, plain note explaining that a page under your domain was not yours does more good than a silent fix, because the phishing email that pointed at it is probably still sitting in someone's inbox, and they'll trust the next one even more.
The owner problem
The real reason subdomains drift is organisational, not technical. Marketing owns one, IT owns the zone file, the agency owns the landing pages, and nobody owns 'the list'. Pick a name. Give them the export. Give them the calendar reminder.
A domain is only as trustworthy as its least-watched hostname. In 2026, that hostname is usually one nobody in the building has typed in two years.